



Procedure for Responding to Railway Incidents

DOCUMENT PROFILE and CONTROL

Purpose of the document: To ensure all operational ambulance and control services personnel and other medical staff dispatched to attend an incident, within a railway trackside environment, are aware of the operational and safety procedures which they must adhere to.

Sponsor Department: Operations Directorate, Department for EPRR

Author/Reviewer: Emergency Planning and Resilience Officer.

To be reviewed by October 2017.

Document Status: Final

Amendment History					
Date	*Version	Author/Contributor	Amendment Details		
12/05/17	5.1	IG Manager	Document Profile & Control update		
04/10/16	4.3	EPRO Will Kearns	New Implementation Plan		
26/07/16	4.2	EPRO Will Kearns	Updated terminology, reduced duplication, inserted table to streamline 'power off and trains stopped' section		
02/05/12	4.1	IG Manager	Document Profile & Control changes		
14/03/12	3.3	DSO Will Kearns	FINAL DRAFT to DDO/ADG		
13/03/12	3.2	EPA (Control Services)	Minor reword focusing EOC responsibilities in 4.2		
16/02/12	3.1	Review Project Lead DSO Will Kearns	Full rewrite of document and name changed to encompass all railway environments in London – previous content incorporated and restructured		
30/7/10	2.11	Staff Officer to the DDO	FINAL		
29/07/10	2.10	Staff Officer to the DDO	Minor following EqIA and staff side consultation		
16/07/10	2.9	Records manager	Added responsibilities		
15/07/10	2.8	Staff Officer to Deputy Director of Operations	Implementation Plan		
08/07/10	2.7	Records Manager	Reformatted		
30/03/09	2.6	Emergency Planning Advisor	Added scope and monitoring		
24/03/09	2.5	Records Manager	Reformatted		
19/03/09	2.4	Emergency Planning Advisor	Implementation plan completed		
16/01/09	2.3	Records Manager	Reformatted		
05/01/09	2.2	Records Manager	Reformatted		
29/12/08	2.1	Emergency Planning Advisor	Introduction updated, 3.2 amended		

*Version Control Note: All documents in development are indicated by minor versions i.e. 0.1; 0.2 etc. The first version of a document to be approved for release is given major version 1.0. Upon review the first version of a revised document is given the designation 1.1, the second 1.2 etc. until the revised version is approved, whereupon it becomes version 2.0. The system continues in numerical order each time a document is reviewed and approved.

Ref. No. OP/009	Title: Procedure for Responding to Railway	Page 2 of 9
	Incidents	

For Approval By:	Date Approved	Version
PMAG	13/10/16	5.0
ADG	27/03/12	4.0
ADO Group	16/8/10	3.0
Chief Executive	06/05	2.0

Published on:	Date	Ву	Dept
The Pulse (v5.1)	12/05/17	Governance Administrator	G&A
The Pulse	03/05/12	Governance Co-ordinator	GCT
LAS Website (v5.1)	12/05/17	Governance Administrator	G&A
LAS website	03/05/12	Governance Co-ordinator	GCT
The Pulse	25/08/10	Records Manager	GDU
LAS Website	25/08/10		
Announced on:	Date	Ву	Dept
The RIB	16/05/17	IG Manager	IG
The RIB	08/10	Records Manager	GDU

Equality Analysis completed on	Ву	
08/03/12	Committee (Review Group)	
29/7/10	Committee	
Staffside reviewed on	Ву	
08/03/12	Pete Hannell	
29/7/10	Pete Hannell	

Links to Related documents or references providing additional information				
Ref. No.	Title	Version		
MIRP	LAS Major Incident Response Procedures	Sept-2016		
LESLP	London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP)	9 th		
	Major Incident Procedure Manual	Edition		
	LAS Contingency Plans (Operational/EOC) LUL Stations	May 2013		
	LAS Contingency Plans (Operational/EOC) LUL Section 12 Stations	May 2013		
	LAS Contingency Plans (Operational/EOC) Network Rail Railway Incidents	May 2013		
	LAS Contingency Plans (Operational/EOC) Tramlink Croydon	May 2013		
	London Underground and the Emergency Services - emergency procedures	2016		
	Network Rail; Emergency Services Rail Incident Protocol	March 2004		
	Network Rail; Railway Safety for the Emergency Services	2004		
	London Air Ambulance; Pre-Hospital Care Standard Operating Procedure: Railway Incidents	July 2010		

Ref. No. OP/009	Title: Presedure for Pechanding to Pollway	Daga 2 of 0
Rei. No. OF/009	Title: Procedure for Responding to Railway	Page 3 of 9
	Institute	
	Incidents	

1. Introduction

The London Ambulance Service is called to respond to many incidents each year which require operational ambulance staff, officers and HEMS/medical staff to enter the railway trackside environment in order to access injured patients.

The railway trackside environment is a hazardous area and although there are different types of railway system in operation across London, they all share common hazards such as working in areas which require controlled access due to the movement of trains, the presence of high voltage power supplies and walking and operating on surfaces which are uneven, slippery and unhygienic.

A number of untoward incidents and near misses have been recorded which have been primarily caused by a lack of compliance with expected procedures by emergency service personnel. These incidents are safety critical and high risk and pose mortal danger to personnel who do not closely follow the required procedures.

The railway environments which this procedure will refer to include the London Underground network both subsurface and above-ground sections, the Network Rail infrastructure encompassing the general 'National Rail' systems in London, the Docklands Light Rail and the Croydon Tramlink.

2. Scope

This procedure applies to incidents which require London Ambulance Service staff or other medical staff dispatched by the London Ambulance Service, to enter and work within the railway trackside environment and applies to all railway trackside environments inside the London area.

3. Objectives

- To ensure all ambulance and medical personnel attending a call within a railway trackside environment have information about the operational procedures relating to working in that environment.
- 2. To promote the safety and welfare of ambulance and medical personnel whilst dealing with an incident on or in close proximity to a railway trackside environment.

4. Responsibilities

4.1 Control Services

4.1.1 EOC is responsible for reminding LAS personnel or medical staff dispatched by the LAS, of the requirement to comply with the POWER principles whenever responding to an incident which is likely to warrant entry into a railway trackside environment.

Ref. No. OP/009	Title: Procedure for Responding to Railway	Page 4 of 9
	Incidents	

- 4.1.2 EOC is responsible for contacting LUL, NR, DLR or CT when personnel have been dispatched to an incident which is likely to warrant entering the railway trackside environment, unless the call originates from the relevant railway authority. The WM desk in EOC holds contact details for railway control centres and the details are listed in the Control Services Resource File. Any information known to EOC in relation to power off/trains stopped must be passed electronically and via radio to personnel despatched to the incident.
- 4.1.3 EOC is responsible for dispatching the sufficient volume and type of personnel to a railway trackside incident to ensure the safety of personnel is protected at all times. An Operational Commander, generally an Incident Response Officer (IRO) or a Clinical Team Leader (CTL) must always be dispatched to perform the role of Scene Commander. An event log must be maintained in EOC of any communications to/from the incident scene including documenting notifications of when responders are entering or leaving the railway trackside environment.

4.2 All Clinical Responders and Commanders

- 4.2.1 Clinical personnel dispatched to railway trackside incidents are responsible for adherence to the operational and safety procedures identified in this procedure. In particular, personnel are required to comply with the POWER principles to ensure safety is of the highest importance, ensuring safe and rapid access to the patient(s) and to efficiently and cooperatively work with other emergency services and railway authorities to standards expected within this procedure.
- 4.2.2 Clinical personnel are responsible for ensuring that only life-saving treatment is initiated in the trackside environment. Advanced life support must be initiated off the trackside in a place deemed to be safe such as a platform or railway sidings area. The trackside area should be evacuated as soon as possible.
- 4.2.3 Clinical personnel must not operate any equipment which is part of the railway infrastructure unless they are specifically trained and competent to do so. An example would be the placement of an SCD.

5. Definitions

BTP	British Transport Police
CT	Croydon Tramlink
DLR	Docklands Light Rail
EOC	Emergency Operations Centre
HART	Hazardous Area Response Team
HEMS	Helicopter Emergency Medical Services
LFB	London Fire Brigade
LUL	London Underground Limited
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service

Ref. No. OP/009	Title: Procedure for Responding to Railway	Page 5 of 9
	Incidents	

NR Network Rail

Pantograph Arm connecting tram to overhead power

RIO Rail Incident Officer SCD Short Circuit Device WM EOC Watch Manager

6. The 'POWER' principles.

- 6.1 Always adhere to the **POWER** principles on any railway trackside incident;
 - P Power off and trains stopped, confirmed by an authorised person on scene or via EOC (see table)
 - Off the tracks unless the patient appears viable
 - W Wear your personal protective equipment always
 - E EOC and LAS Scene Commander must be informed when staff are entering or leaving trackside
 - R Rapidly remove the viable patient and treat in a safe, agreed area

	Who is authorised to confirm power is off and trains are stopped	Who to contact if the authorised person is not immediately available	Other considerations
London Underground	A member of station staff, typically Customer Service Manager or similar grade A Network Incident Response Manager (NIRM) will eventually become the Silver Control, transported to scene by BTP under emergency conditions	EOC to contact the London Underground Control Centre and request an emergency confirmation that power is off and trains have been stopped Alternatively, they will arrange an alternative authorised person to attend scene	Short Circuit Devices (SCDs) must be visualised at the front and rear of the incident train If no train is involved, SCDs will not be present
Network Rail (National Rail) including 'London Overground'	A Rail Incident Officer (RIO) will be transported to scene by BTP under emergency conditions If the power supply is overhead, it will not be discharged unless access to the top of the train is required	EOC should contact the relevant Network Rail Control Centre who will confirm if power is off and if trains have been stopped	SCDs may be in use but they are not necessary to work under a train
Ref. No. OP/009	Title: Procedure for R	esponding to Railway	Page 6 of 9

Docklands Light Rail	An Incident Officer will travel to scene but this will take time DLR Control are likely to confirm trains are stopped and power is off at the time of the emergency call	EOC should contact DLR Control who will confirm if power is off and if trains have been stopped	SCDs will be deployed at the front of the incident train and on the adjacent track Emergency responders can use the platform emergency panel to contact DLR control
Croydon Tramlink	The tram driver will confirm is trams have been stopped Power is supplied overhead and will not be discharged unless access to the top of the tram is needed	Tramlink Control can confirm if trams have been stopped in the area	There is no ground level power supply so SCDs are not used

6.2 Off the tracks unless the patient appears viable.

Patient viability should be ascertained before entering the trackside, wherever possible. This means clinical personnel will need to walk the length of the train and attempt to visualise the patient and their condition, if the train is adjacent to the platform. If viability cannot be visually verified for any reason, only the most clinically qualified person should enter trackside/under the train to assess the viability of the patient. Strict compliance with ROLE criteria must be adhered to if visually recognising life extinct.

6.3 Wear your personal protective equipment always. High visibility clothing MUST be worn at all times and responders must wear a protective helmet when entering the trackside environment and whenever working under a train. HART staff wear highly effective PPE and so should be targeted to work under a train if on scene.

6.4 EOC and LAS Scene Commander must be informed when staff are entering or leaving trackside. Clinical personnel must ensure that EOC and the LAS Scene

Clinical personnel must ensure that EOC and the LAS Scene Commander are aware that they are entering and leaving the trackside environment so that they can maintain an overview of responder safety at all times. Only the necessary number of clinical responders should enter the trackside environment whilst awaiting direction from the clinical lead.

6.5 Rapidly remove the viable patient and treat in a safe, agreed area.

Ref. No. OP/009	Title: Procedure for Responding to Railway	Page 7 of 9
	Incidents	

Only basic life support should be performed in the trackside environment. A viable patient should be extricated away from the trackside environment as soon as possible.

7.0 Further generic requirements

- 7.1 Clinical personnel should not touch any railway or tram tracks unless absolutely necessary and only when power is off. Clinical personnel must never walk on rails as they are slippery and should be treated as live even when power is off. Clinical personnel must recognise that a railway trackside environment is hazardous.
- 7.2 It is the responsibility of the LAS Scene Commander to maintain an overview of the impact of the incident on other potential incidents and to work to minimise this at all times. Restoring power on railway lines means trains can be moved and even restored to normal, preventing potential casualties being stranded on stationery trains. All clinical responders should be aware that the recovery of trains moving is important in preventing further secondary incidents.
- 7.3 Once it has been 'identified' or recognised that life is extinct, clinical personnel must withdraw immediately away from the trackside environment. They should perform Recognition Of Life Extinct in accordance with LAS policy and not re-enter the trackside environment. A single LAS responder or crew should remain on scene under the direction of the LAS Scene Commander, to complete ROLE documentation and all other clinical personnel must depart the incident site.
- 7.4 It is the responsibility of the British Transport Police, on behalf of HM Coroner, to take responsibility for the deceased including directing any agency involved in the recovery of the body.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN						
Intended Audie	-	All operational ambulance staff, commanders, HEMS staff, Control Services staff.				
Dissemination	Available	Available to all staff on The Pulse.				
Communicatio		Revised procedure to be announced in the RIB and a link provided to the document. Poster campaign to raise awareness.				
Training	Access to	Access to e-learning package and awareness section on The Pulse.				
Monitoring:						
Aspect to be monitored	Frequency of monitoring AND Tool used	Individual/ team responsible for carrying out monitoring AND Committee/ group where results are reported	Committee/ group responsible for monitoring outcomes/ recommendations	How learning will take place		
Compliance with OP009 and rail incident protocols using incident reviews provided through operational commanders and DATIX reports	Monthly reviews of specific incidents with railway authorities DATIX trends analysed twice yearly	Department for EPRR (EPRO with portfolio for railway incidents) will complete reviews and report trends to Assistant Director Operations - Resilience	Assistant Director of Operations Group	Updates and lessons communicated through EPRR bulletins Commander training (for rail incidents) to incorporate lessons identified		