



London Ambulance Service **NHS**  
NHS Trust

## Procedure for Responding to Railway Incidents

## **DOCUMENT PROFILE and CONTROL**

**Purpose of the document:** To ensure all ambulance personnel or other medical staff dispatched to attend an incident, within a railway trackside environment in the London area, is aware of the operational and safety procedures which they must adhere to.

**Sponsor Department:** Operations Directorate

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**Document Status:** FINAL

<b>Amendment History</b>			
Date	*Version	Author/Contributor	Amendment Details
02/05/12	4.1	IG Manager	Document Profile & Control changes
14/03/12	3.3	DSO Will Kearns	FINAL DRAFT to DDO/ADG
13/03/12	3.2	EPA (Control Services)	Minor reword focusing EOC responsibilities in 4.2
16/02/12	3.1	Review Project Lead DSO Will Kearns	Full rewrite of document and name changed to encompass all railway environments in London – previous content incorporated and restructured
30/7/10	2.11	Staff Officer to the DDO	FINAL
29/07/10	2.10	Staff Officer to the DDO	Minor following EqIA and staff side consultation
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15/07/10	2.8	Staff Officer to Deputy Director of Operations	Implementation Plan
08/07/10	2.7	Records Manager	Reformatted
30/03/09	2.6	Emergency Planning Advisor	Added scope and monitoring
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29/12/08	2.1	Emergency Planning Advisor	Introduction updated, 3.2 amended

**\*Version Control Note:** All documents in development are indicated by minor versions i.e. 0.1; 0.2 etc. The first version of a document to be approved for release is given major version 1.0. Upon review the first version of a revised document is given the designation 1.1, the second 1.2 etc. until the revised version is approved, whereupon it becomes version 2.0. The system continues in numerical order each time a document is reviewed and approved.

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<b>Links to Related documents or references providing additional information</b>		
<b>Ref. No.</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Version</b>
TP023	Driving Care of Service Vehicles	
MIP/003	LAS Major Incident Plan	
LESLP	London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Procedure Manual	<b>7<sup>th</sup> Edition</b>
	LAS Contingency Plans (Operational/EOC) LUL Stations	<b>March 2009</b>
	LAS Contingency Plans (Operational/EOC) LUL Section 12 Stations	<b>March 2009</b>
	LAS Contingency Plans (Operational/EOC) Network Rail Railway Incidents	<b>March 2009</b>
	LAS Contingency Plans (Operational/EOC) Tramlink Croydon	<b>March 2009</b>
	LUL Information for Emergency Services Personnel Attending London Underground Incidents	<b>5, July 2009</b>
	Network Rail Emergency Services Rail Incident Protocol	<b>March 2004</b>
	Network Rail Railway Safety for the Emergency Services	<b>2004</b>
	HEMS Pre-Hospital Care Standard Operating Procedure: Railway Incidents	<b>July 2010</b>

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## 1. Introduction

The London Ambulance Service is called to respond to many incidents each year which require operational ambulance staff, officers and HEMS/medical staff to enter the railway trackside environment in order to access injured patients.

The railway trackside environment is a hazardous area and although there are different types of railway system in operation across London, they all share common hazards such as working in areas which require controlled access due to the movement of trains, the presence of high voltage power supplies and walking and operating on surfaces which are uneven, slippery and unhygienic.

A number of untoward incidents and near misses have been recorded which have been primarily caused by a lack of compliance with expected procedures by emergency service personnel. These incidents are safety critical and high risk and pose mortal danger to personnel who do not closely follow the required procedures.

The railway environments which this procedure will refer to include the London Underground network both underground and overground sections, the Network Rail infrastructure encompassing the general 'National Rail' systems in London, the Docklands Light Rail and the Croydon Tramlink.

## 2. Scope

This procedure applies to incidents which require London Ambulance Service staff or other medical staff dispatched by the London Ambulance Service, to enter and work within the railway trackside environment and applies to all railway trackside environments inside the London area.

## 3. Objectives

1. To ensure all ambulance and medical personnel attending a call within a railway trackside environment have information about the operational procedures relating to working in that environment.
2. To promote the safety and welfare of ambulance and medical personnel whilst dealing with an incident on or in close proximity to a railway trackside environment.

## 4. Responsibilities

- 4.1 EOC is responsible for reminding LAS personnel or medical staff dispatched by the LAS, of the requirement to comply with the POWER principles whenever responding to an incident which is likely to warrant entry into a railway trackside environment.
- 4.2 EOC is responsible for contacting LUL, NWR, DLR or CTL when personnel have been dispatched to an incident which is likely to warrant entering the railway trackside environment, unless the call originates from the relevant railway authority. The OCM desk in EOC holds contact details for railway control centres and the

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details are listed in the Control Services Resource File. Any information known to EOC in relation to power off/trains stopped must be passed electronically and via R/T to personnel dispatched to the incident.

- 4.3 EOC is responsible for dispatching the sufficient volume and type of personnel to a railway trackside incident to ensure the safety of personnel is protected at all times. A duty station officer or other appropriately qualified officer must always be dispatched to perform the role of Incident Officer. An incident log must be maintained in EOC of any communications to/from the incident scene including documenting notifications of when responders are entering or leaving the railway trackside environment.
- 4.4 LAS and medical personnel dispatched to railway trackside incidents are responsible for adherence to the operational and safety procedures identified in this procedure. In particular, personnel are required to comply with the **POWER** principles to ensure safety is of the highest importance, ensuring safe and rapid access to the patient(s) and to efficiently and cooperatively work with other emergency services and railway authorities to standards expected within this procedure.
- 4.5 LAS and medical personnel are responsible for ensuring that only life saving treatment is initiated in the trackside environment. Advanced life support must be initiated off the trackside in a place deemed to be safe such as a platform or railway sidings area. The trackside area should be evacuated as soon as possible.
- 4.6 LAS and medical personnel must not operate any equipment which is part of the railway infrastructure unless they are specifically trained and competent to do so. An example would be lowering the pantograph on a tram or placement of an SCD.

## 5. Definitions

EOC	Emergency Operations Centre
OCM	Operations Centre Manager
LFB	London Fire Brigade
BTP	British Transport Police
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
LUL	London Underground Limited
NWR	Network Rail
DLR	Docklands Light Rail
CTL	Croydon Tramlink
HEMS	Helicopter Emergency Medical Services
Pantograph	Arm connecting tram to overhead power
SCD	Short Circuit Device – bar placed across tracks to isolate power supply to the train
RIO	Rail Incident Officer - Network Rail lead officer on scene

**6. Adhere to the 'POWER' principles at all railway trackside incidents.**

6.1 Always adhere to the **POWER** principles on any railway trackside incident:

**P** = Power off/trains stopped confirmed by authorised person – when in doubt, contact EOC

**O** = Off the tracks unless the patient appears viable

**W** = Wear your personal protective equipment

**E** = Ensure EOC or LAS Incident Officer knows you are entering or leaving trackside

**R** = Remove viable patient and treat in a safe area

**7.0 Incidents occurring on the London Underground infrastructure.**

7.1 **Power off and trains stopped confirmed by authorised person.**

The authorised person who can confirm that power is off and trains are stopped is the Silver Control Officer at the LUL site. Initially, this is likely to be the Station Supervisor (who will be replaced by a more senior manager) wearing a silver/white tabard. In their unlikely absence, LAS personnel should contact EOC who will contact the Network Operations Centre (NOC) at LUL to confirm power is switched off and trains are stopped. LAS personnel can use the headwall telephone to speak directly with the Line Service Controller who will switch off the power and stop trains.

The LAS Incident Officer, or the member of staff acting in this capacity, will liaise with the LUL Silver Control Officer and then brief any further arriving LAS responders. Short Circuit Devices should be placed at the front and rear of the train on the tracks, to isolate the power. These should be visualised by a member of LAS or HEMS personnel or by the LFB and this should be openly communicated on scene.

7.2 **Off the tracks unless the patient appears viable.**

Patient viability should be ascertained before entering the trackside, wherever possible. This means LAS personnel will need to walk the length of the train and attempt to visualise the patient and their condition, if the train is adjacent to the platform. If viability cannot be visually verified for any reason, only the most clinically qualified person should enter trackside/under the train to assess the viability of the patient.

7.3 **Wear your personal protective equipment.**

High visibility clothing **MUST** be worn at all times and responders must have access to a protective helmet. It may prove more difficult to wear a protective helmet under a train but this will be a dynamic assessment for the LAS responder.

7.4 **Ensure LAS Incident Officer/EOC knows you are entering or leaving trackside.**

LAS personnel must ensure that EOC or the LAS Incident Officer is aware that they are entering or leaving the trackside environment so that they can maintain an overview of responder safety at all times. Only the necessary number of LAS responders should enter the trackside environment whilst awaiting direction from the clinical lead.

- 7.5 **Remove viable patient and treat in a safe area.**  
Only basic life support should be performed in the trackside environment. A viable patient should be extricated away from the trackside environment as soon as possible.
- 7.6 It is the responsibility of the British Transport Police to manage a deceased patient or in their absence, the local Home Office force.

**8.0 Incidents occurring on the Network Rail infrastructure.**

- 8.1 **Power off and trains stopped confirmed by authorised person.**  
The authorised person for Network Rail who can confirm that power is off and trains are stopped is the Rail Incident Officer (RIO) on scene who is a railways expert and has full authority to enact requests from emergency services and all on-scene communications with Network Rail should be through the RIO once they arrive on scene. The RIO will also agree a safe system of work with the LAS in terms of a safe area to work within which may include allowing trains to run at caution on lines a suitable distance away from the incident/patient location.

In the absence of a RIO, EOC should contact the Network Rail Control Centre directly to confirm power is off/isolated and trains are stopped and they can also confirm the best access points for the incident. British Transport Police can also provide scene access information if required. The LAS Incident Officer, or the member of staff acting in this capacity, should liaise with the RIO and then brief any further arriving LAS responders.

- 8.2 **Off the tracks unless the patient appears viable.**  
Patient viability should be ascertained before entering the trackside, wherever possible. This means LAS personnel will need to walk the length of the train and attempt to visualise the patient and their condition, if the train is adjacent to the platform. If viability cannot be visually verified for any reason, only the most clinically qualified person should enter trackside/under the train to assess the viability of the patient.
- 8.3 **Wear your personal protective equipment**  
High visibility clothing **MUST** be worn at all times and responders must have access to a protective helmet. It may prove more difficult to wear a protective helmet under a train but this will be a dynamic assessment for the LAS responder.
- 8.4 **Ensure LAS Incident Officer/EOC knows you are entering or leaving trackside.**

LAS personnel must ensure that EOC or the LAS Incident Officer is aware that they are entering or leaving the trackside environment so that they can maintain an overview of responder safety at all times. Only the necessary number of LAS responders should enter the trackside environment whilst awaiting direction from the clinical lead.

- 8.5 **Remove viable patient and treat in a safe area.**  
Only basic life support should be performed in the trackside environment. A viable patient should be extricated away from the trackside environment as soon as possible.
- 8.6 It is the responsibility of the British Transport Police to manage a deceased patient or in their absence, the local Home Office force.
- 9.0 Incidents occurring on the Docklands Light Rail infrastructure.**
- 9.1 **Power off and trains stopped confirmed by authorised person.**  
The authorised person who can confirm that power is off and trains are stopped is the DLR Duty Manager at scene. This can also be performed through EOC who can contact the DLR Central Control via telephone. There are also passenger call points on the station platform which link directly to the DLR Central Control. Short Circuit Devices should be placed at the front of the train on the tracks and on the adjacent line, to isolate the power. These should be visualised by a member of LAS personnel, HEMS personnel or by the LFB.
- 9.2 **Off the tracks unless the patient appears viable.**  
Patient viability should be ascertained before entering the trackside, wherever possible. This means LAS personnel will need to walk the length of the train and attempt to visualise the patient and their condition. If viability cannot be verified and only when power is off and trains have been stopped, a single LAS responder should enter trackside/under the train to assess the condition of the patient.
- 9.3 **Wear your personal protective equipment.**  
High visibility clothing **MUST** be worn at all times and responders must have access to a protective helmet. It may prove more difficult to wear a protective helmet under a train but this will be a dynamic assessment for the LAS responder.
- 9.4 **Ensure LAS Incident Officer/EOC knows you are entering or leaving trackside.**  
LAS personnel must ensure that the LAS Incident Officer is aware that they are entering or leaving the trackside environment so that they can maintain an overview of responder safety at all times. Only the necessary number of LAS responders should enter the trackside environment whilst others wait on the platform to receive the patient.



9.5 **Remove viable patient and treat in a safe area.**  
Only basic life support should be performed in the trackside environment. A viable patient should be extricated away from the trackside environment as soon as possible.

9.6 It is the responsibility of the British Transport Police to manage a deceased patient or in their absence, the local Home Office force.

10.0 **Incidents occurring on the Croydon Tramlink infrastructure.**

10.1 **Power off and trams stopped confirmed by authorised person.**  
The authorised person who can confirm power is off and the trams are stopped is the tram driver or EOC can contact the CTL Control who can confirm the movements of trams has been restricted and CTL will notify other tram drivers of the location of the incident and the presence of emergency services. The tram driver is able to lower the pantograph from the overhead power cables which isolates the tram from power.

Whilst the pantograph is in connection with the overhead power cables, the wheels and undercarriage are electrified.

10.2 **Off the tracks unless the patient appears viable.**  
Patient viability should be ascertained before entering the trackside, wherever possible. This means LAS personnel will need to walk the length of the tram and attempt to visualise the patient and their condition, if the tram is on a platform or roadside. If viability cannot be verified and only when power is off and trams have been stopped, a single LAS responder should enter trackside/under the tram to assess the condition of the patient.

10.3 **Wear your personal protective equipment.**  
High visibility clothing **MUST** be worn at all times and responders must have access to a protective helmet. It may prove more difficult to wear a protective helmet under a tram but this will be a dynamic assessment for the LAS responder.

10.4 **Ensure LAS Incident Officer/EOC knows you are entering or leaving trackside.**  
LAS personnel must ensure that the LAS Incident Officer is aware that they are entering or leaving the trackside environment so that they can maintain an overview of responder safety at all times. Only the necessary number of LAS responders should enter the trackside environment whilst others wait on the platform or suitable safe location to receive the patient.

10.5 **Remove viable patient and treat in a safe area.**  
Only basic life support should be performed in the trackside environment. A viable patient should be extricated away from the trackside environment as soon as possible.

10.6 When engaged on a call which necessitate crossing the tramway and when a red traffic signal shows, the driver must:

STOP THE VEHICLE ON THE CORRECT SIDE OF THE ROAD, SWITCH OFF THEIR SIRENS AND BLUE LIGHTS AND REMAIN THERE UNTIL THE TRAFFIC SIGNAL INDICATES THAT THE LINE IS CLEAR.

- 10.7 Service staff in attendance must also satisfy themselves that there is not a second tram approaching. An indicator at the roadside will show that a second tram is approaching. Where there are no lights controlling the crossing, the driver must stop and satisfy themselves that the line is clear before proceeding.
- 10.8 In the event that a moving tram strikes a pedestrian and that pedestrian goes under the front of the tram, a beam known as the 'Lifeguard' will prevent them from coming into contact with the wheels. It should be noted this device is only fully effective on street running sections where the track and road surfaces are level. The Lifeguard can be easily removed by the LFB to facilitate any rescue efforts.
- 10.9 It is the responsibility of the British Transport Police to manage a deceased patient or in their absence, the local Home Office force.
- 11.0 **Further generic requirements**
- 11.1 LAS personnel should not touch any railway or tram tracks unless absolutely necessary and only when power is off or isolated. LAS personnel must never walk on rails as they are slippery and should be treated as live even when power is switched off or isolated. LAS personnel must recognise that a railway trackside environment is hazardous.
- 11.2 It is the responsibility of the LAS Incident Officer to maintain an overview of the impact of their incident on other potential incidents and to work to minimise this at all times. Restoring power on railway lines means trains can be moved and even restored to normal, preventing potential casualties being stranded on stationery trains.
- 11.3 Once it has been 'identified' or recognised that life is extinct, LAS and medical personnel must withdraw immediately away from the trackside environment. They should perform Recognition Of Life Extinct in accordance with LAS policy and not re-enter the trackside environment. A single LAS responder or crew should remain on scene under the direction of the LAS Incident Officer, to complete ROLE and all other LAS and medical personnel must depart the incident site immediately.

<b>IMPLEMENTATION PLAN</b>	
<b>Intended Audience</b>	All operational staff, officers, HEMS staff, Control services staff.
<b>Dissemination</b>	Available to all staff on The Pulse.
<b>Communications</b>	Revised procedure to be announced in the RIB and a link provided to the document. Poster campaign to raise awareness.
<b>Training</b>	Access to e-learning package and awareness section on The Pulse.
<b>Monitoring</b>	<p>In the event of an untoward incident on any railway trackside environment, EOC or the Incident Officer must notify the LAS Emergency Planning Unit of the incident in order that a review can be undertaken.</p> <p>Serious incidents or near misses will be reported to the Corporate Health and Safety Group. Any issues of significant note will be reported to Risk, Compliance and Assurance Group (RCAG).</p> <p>Particular attention will be paid to staff most likely to respond to calls which will call for the procedure to be used.</p>